Straightening out visible flaw in public works

The internet exploded with recently the viral memes over a rail overbridge in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, featuring a baffling sharp 90-degree turn. But as the laughter faded, a more serious concern lingered—how did a basic design oversight escape layers of technical scrutiny and public accountability? The episode, eventually leading to a redesign, is not an isolated blip. For example, in Delhi, almost a decade ago, a foot overbridge was constructed in the middle of a road. This bizarre design, and the broader issues it represents, are a daily, jarring reality, and shines a spotlight on a deeper malaise afflicting infrastructure development in many parts of India, including in economically poorer states like Bihar. Consider Patna’s flyovers: a smooth ride remains elusive, with frequent jerks and immediate waterlogging even from light drizzles. The abrupt landings, feeling more like a free fall than a controlled descent, highlight a critical question: why are these pervasive design flaws so common in crucial public infrastructure.

This isn’t merely about technical incompetence, though that certainly plays a part. It’s a profound breakdown in the incentives that drive public works, a fundamental disconnect between those who design and build, and those who suffer the consequences. As one might cynically observe, it seems the designers themselves have no incentive to actually ride these flyovers. This is a stark example of the “alienation of work” – where the creator is utterly detached from the impact of their creation.

When a public good is commissioned, it embarks on a journey through the tendering process. This is where the decisions are made: who designs, who builds, and at what cost. But do the decision-makers possess sufficient information to choose wisely? Crucially, are their incentives aligned with the social interest – with the safety, comfort, and long-term well-being of the very public they serve? For instance, in a well-functioning market, self-interest typically drives quality. A private company producing a faulty car quickly loses customers and profits.

Their reputation is at stake. The market inherently punishes bad design and shoddy construction. But in the realm of public goods, particularly in resource-poor regions like Bihar, this delicate alignment often breaks down. Political actors’ incentive might be to announce projects quickly, even if ill-conceived, to gain political mileage, policy makers’ self-interest might lean towards risk-aversion, adhering strictly to procedural compliances (even if flawed), and contractors and designers’ primary self-interest is often profit maximization, particularly when the financial priority of the tender process often leaves little room for a technical priority. This misaligned incentive structure creates what economists call “moral hazard”—when decision-makers don’t bear the consequences of their choices.

In Bihar, these challenges are compounded. Being a poor state, the fiscal space is limited, making it more vulnerable to “lowest bid” traps that compromise quality. Institutional weaknesses mean regulatory bodies and anti-corruption agencies may lack teeth. A dearth of highly skilled professionals can further exacerbate design and execution flaws. And, perhaps most significantly, the political economy of corruption often sees massive infrastructure projects as prime targets for illicit gains, overshadowing the fundamental purpose of serving the public.

The consequence is a vicious cycle: shoddy infrastructure leads to public frustration, wasted taxpayer money on repeated repairs or redesigns, and a perception that public services are inherently inferior.
The missing piece is skin in the game. In well-functioning systems, those who design and implement infrastructure are embedded within the community they serve. Their reputations, careers, and personal dignity are tied to the outcomes. But in fragmented, low-trust systems, nobody owns the outcome. Everyone passes the buck. What is needed is a fundamental shift in the approach to public works. First, the tendering system needs to evolve, with a prioritisation of technical competence and design innovation over just cost. Second, citizen audits and community feedback mechanisms should become integral to infrastructure evaluation. Third, bring the user into the room. Let bridge or road designers ride through their creations before they are certified. Link contract payments to long-term performance metrics. Incentivize engineers through public recognition, awards, or even shared bonuses tied to usage satisfaction.

Countries like Chile and South Korea have successfully used integrated project delivery systems that involve designers, builders, and users from the outset. Brazil has experimented with participatory budgeting for local infrastructure. Even within India, states like Kerala have used local self-government structures to create more responsive infrastructure planning. The key lesson: align incentives early, and embed users into decision-making.

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