The grammar of rivers- Choosing cooperation over conflict in the Indus

Geography and its ecosystems uniquely shape the connections and boundaries that define regions. While society may seek to define itself through religion, culture, language, race, or other distinctions, the fundamental principles of ecology persist, reminding us of our limitations as human beings in addressing these enduring realities. The narrative of the Indus River, known in some contexts as Sindhu, is a powerful illustration of these connections. This majestic river flows predominantly between the nations of India and Pakistan, originating from the beautiful yet rugged Tibetan Autonomous Region, under Chinese administration. Historically, the Indus has served as a life source for countless civilisations, granting its name to the country of India and closely intertwining with the ancient Hindu civilisation that flourished along its banks thousands of years ago.

In April 2025, the Indus returned to the centre of regional geopolitics. Following the tragic Pahalgam attack that claimed 26 lives, India placed the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance—pausing its implementation without formally withdrawing from it. Signed in Karachi in 1960 with World Bank mediation, the treaty has long been regarded as one of the most durable water-sharing arrangements in the world. This pause is unprecedented. Since the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947, the treaty had survived wars, political ruptures, and prolonged hostility. Its suspension carries profound implications for millions whose food security, livelihoods, and ecosystems are bound to the Indus basin.

What is important is to understand a bit about the historicity of the Indus water treaty, issues, context and current situation before dwelling on other important elements attached with it. According to Britannica, the Indus River is one of the longest rivers in the world, stretches about 2,000 miles (3,200 km). It has a drainage area of around 450,000 square miles (1,165,000 square km), with 175,000 square miles (453,000 square km) in the Himalayas, Hindu Kush, and Karakoram Range, and the remainder in Pakistan’s semiarid plains. The river’s annual flow is about 58 cubic miles (243 cubic km)—twice that of the Nile River and three times that of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers combined. 

The Treaty

The source of the treaty lies in the water dispute that arose after the partition of India and Pakistan.  The partition cut the irrigation system of the Bari Doab (West Punjab, Pakistan) and the Sutlej Valley Project—originally designed as one scheme—into two parts, developed by British India. The headwork or barrage was placed in India, while the canals ran through Pakistan. That led to a disruption in the water supply in some parts of Pakistan. The dispute that thus arose and continued for some years was resolved through the mediation of the World Bank by a treaty between Pakistan and India (1960) known as the Indus Waters Treaty. It is recorded that, former head of the Tennessee Valley Authority(TVA) in 1951, David Lilienthal, from U.S.A who also helped in setting the DVC( Damodar Valley Corporation) power project in India, suggested that India and Pakistan should work toward an agreement to jointly develop and administer the Indus River system, possibly with advice and financing from the World Bank. Eugene Black(1949-62), who was then the president of the World Bank, agreed.  It is also noted that the signing of the treaty was one of the hallmarks of the dispute settlement mechanism to resolve the trans boundary questions; however, it was a strong realisation that India had conceded more to its neighbouring country of water usage and gained less. In terms of the provisions of the Treaty, the Western rivers (the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) were allocated to Pakistan, whereas the eastern rivers (the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) were allocated to India. Under the Treaty, India was given unrestricted use of the eastern rivers, and Pakistan was given the right to the unrestricted flow of the western rivers, with India being permitted some limited uses such as navigation, power generation and fisheries. Among these, importantly, were the right to construct run-of-the-river hydroelectric projects, which involve little or no water storage.

“While the treaty divided rivers by number, it was volume—not count—that determined real advantage.” Indus is the largest river in South Asia, and Pakistan was entitled to 80% of the water flow from the Indus under the treaty agreement. One of the reasons that Pakistan got the right to use a high percentage of water is because of its downstream geography, and western-flowing rivers carry more water than the eastern flow of the river. The Indus Water Treaty of 1960 did not mention the flow of water into the river; however, while extracting from several sources online, this could be as follows-             

As specified in Article V(i) of the treaty, India has committed to paying £620,600,000 to establish the Indus Basin Development Fund, Pakistan. This substantial investment was aimed at enhancing irrigation infrastructure and addressing the disruptions to water supplies from the eastern rivers that occurred after the partition in 1947. In a bid to promote transparency and cooperation, both parties have also agreed to share detailed data regarding the flow and usage of water from these critical rivers.

Key Concerns 

From the perspective of India, the Jammu and Kashmir region faces considerable development challenges related to its agricultural sector. For instance, less than 50% of the region’s net sown area is irrigated, a stark contrast to the over 95% irrigation coverage found in Punjab. This lack of irrigation leads to a heavy reliance on rainfall, making agriculture in Jammu and Kashmir largely subsistence-oriented and vulnerable to climatic variations.

Moreover, the treaty imposes specific limitations on the pondage capacity, which refers to the short-term storage of water, as well as on spillway gates and live storage. These restrictions significantly hinder the region’s ability to effectively manage its water resources. Despite the region being endowed with abundant hydroelectric potential, Jammu and Kashmir faces the paradox of electricity shortages during the winter months, resulting in the state having to import electricity (Capacity depleted to 1000 MW as against the demand of 3000 MW as reported 2nd Dec 2024 TOI report). As per the IWT agreement large percentage cannot be harnessed for the benefit of the state as the IWT only allows for run-of-the-river projects that do not affect the riparian rights of Pakistan. As a result of being denied the opportunity to completely utilise the hydropower potential of rivers flowing through their own lands, people in the Kashmir region see the IWT as being responsible for this significant loss. This reliance not only strains the state’s finances but also presents further livelihood challenges for its residents. Additionally, the economy of Jammu and Kashmir remains heavily dependent on the tourism sector, which, while vital, offers limited opportunities for diversification. This dependence restricts the region’s ability to create a more robust and varied economic base, leaving it particularly vulnerable to external shocks and seasonal fluctuations in tourist activity. Another important stumbling block is the perpetuity of the treaty, which sets no dates of treaty to expire revision of the terms of the agreement between the two parties. As this is entirely possible that context and situation will change over the years, and demand for water and its use will increase over time. According to the census, the population of J&K in 1960 was around 2.5 million, whereas in 2011 it reaches to 2011 12.5 million. The latest census has yet to be actual population figures.

Across the Border 

From the point of view of the other side of the border, dependence on the Indus water is equally acute. According to the World Bank report published in 2009, “The Indus Basin of Pakistan: The Impacts of Climate Risks on Water and Agriculture”, the Indus water is the backbone of the country’s agricultural economy, providing basic food security and water supply for all sectors of the economy. It has 3 major multipurpose storage reservoirs (Tarbela, Mangla and Chasma), 19 barrages, 12 inter-river link canals, 45 major irrigation canal commands (covering over 18 million hectares), and over 120,000 watercourses delivering water to farms and other productive uses. Annual river flows are about 146 million acre-feet (MAF), of which about 106 MAF of water is diverted from the river system to canals annually (COMSATS 2003). The total length of the canals is about 60,000 km, with communal watercourses, farm channels, and field ditches running another 1.8 million km. These canals operate in tandem with a vast and growing process of groundwater extraction from private tubewells.One could understand the dependence of the country and its system on the river water and the impact of its economy when the water flow is disturbed.   

What Now- 

As the treaty now rests in abeyance, its implementation paused by the Government of India—though not its legal existence—the moment calls for reflection rather than rupture. This pause offers both nations an opportunity: to return to the table, not in haste or hostility, but with the maturity that six decades of experience demand. Additionally, other recommendations could be-

Structured Renegotiation Grounded in Contemporary Realities

Any renegotiation must reflect present-day hydrological, demographic, and geopolitical conditions rather than the assumptions of the 1950s. The objective should be recalibration, not dismantling.

Integrate Climate Change as a Core Treaty Principle

Climate variability, glacial retreat, extreme precipitation, and altered river regimes must be explicitly embedded within the treaty framework. Water-sharing agreements should evolve from static allocation models to adaptive, climate-resilient governance systems.

Shift the Focus from Allocation to Basin Resilience

Future cooperation should move beyond volumetric division of rivers toward basin-wide resilience—addressing sediment management, salinity control, flood moderation, drought preparedness, and ecosystem restoration. Water negotiations should integrate agriculture, energy, ecology, disaster risk reduction, and livelihoods. Fragmented sectoral management is no longer viable under conditions of climate stress and rising demand. Rising salinity, sediment accumulation, and flow disruption are transboundary ecological challenges. These must be treated as shared survival concerns rather than sovereign bargaining points.

Cooperation as Strategic Leadership, 

When Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that water and blood cannot flow side by side, the statement was not merely political—it was philosophical. It was a call to choose wisely: between conflict and cooperation, between short-term assertion and long-term security. Choosing the right cause is not an act of concession; it is an act of leadership—one that strengthens food and water security across the region and offers the world a rare example of a transboundary peace mechanism suited to the needs of our time, and resilient enough for the future.

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