Autocrats’ BFFs: Elites with a grudge

More often than not, we tend to associate autocratic regimes with a cult of personalities. Think Hitler, Stalin, Idi Amin. However, no autocrat rules alone. They are all supported by an elite that actually props up the regimes. Twilight Of Democracy: The Failure Of Politics And The Parting Of Friends by Anne Applebaum explores how this class of elite is created, what motivates them to support autocrats, and why perfectly intelligent people junk their liberal instincts.

Law and Justice Party in Poland and Viktor Orban’s Fidesz in Hungary both successfully bludgeoned the established elite to rise to power. In Poland’s case, the device of choice was the Smolensk conspiracy, around the 2010 plane crash killing then president Lech Kaczynski. The conspiracy not only served as a vehicle to polarise Polish society, but also gave Law and Justice Party the ammunition to demonise the opposition, and accuse them variously of being communists, working with Russia or simply being anti-Poland.

In the process, Law and Justice was able to increase its hold on political power, neutralise the media, and take over businesses through those close to the party. Similarly, over in Hungary, Orban used the bogey of immigration (Hungary practically has no immigrants), the manufactured lie of George Soros undermining Hungary and Christian values, and the tyranny of EU bureaucrats in Brussels, to advance his hold over power, says Applebaum.

But why did people go along with these deceptions? Moreover, why did people of significant intellect – also close friends of the author – switch out their liberal, European values, and join the ideology and tactics they had earlier fought against during the Cold War?

There are multiple explanations. First, some of these intellectuals felt liberalisation did not benefit them as much as their peers. This was a heavy chip on their shoulders. So, when the opportunity arose to shaft their elite peers, they gleefully took it without any concern for rule of law and democratic values.

Others were simply cynical, like Boris Johnson. Starting off as a British correspondent in Brussels, he would hand in sensationalist reports about EU with little grain of truth. He was even blasé about it. But those reports played a part in influencing Euro-sceptic Conservative members of British Parliament and driving the Brexit movement later.
Why would Johnson do such a thing? Per Applebaum, perhaps because of his own background, which was very much rooted in the British elite and aristocratic clubs such as the Bullingdon at Oxford. Johnson clearly felt the pomp and show was ridiculous. Therefore, he didn’t mind chucking stones at his own elite peers.

Then, there is nostalgia. Reformative nostalgia seeks to physically recreate an imagined great past – like resurrecting the prowess of the old British Empire. But who do you blame for the decline? Outsiders, of course – immigrants, EU and the liberal elite.

Finally, Applebaum theorises that great changes of the 21st century won’t come like they did in the past, precisely because media has been democratised. There are many who instinctively struggle with diversity and want simplicity. Established traditional media ensured debates were confined to a narrow comfortable spectrum. New media breaks that mould with a cacophony of opinions. This in turn has the opposite effect of pushing people into their comfortable information silos, making them more susceptible to manipulation, and empowering autocrats.

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